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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Whether a defendant owns an interest in the land is

irrelevant in determining liability under the 1987 contractor's
bond statute.

Rather, liability depends on whether the defendant

contracted for the construction, alteration, or repair of a
building, structure, or improvement on land.

Since the placement

of telecommunications cable beneath a public street does not
constitute an improvement on land, there is no liability under the
statute.

In any event, U S WEST Communications did not own an

interest in the land, since its only right to place the cable
arose through a revocable license.
2.

The contractor's bond statute does not apply unless the

labor and materials add value to the real property where they are
furnished.

Since it is undisputed that the installation of

telecommunications cable beneath the street did not add value to
the real property, the statute does not apply in this case. The
fact that U S WEST Communications may have received a benefit from
the cable is insufficient to invoke application of the statute.
3.

The contractor's bond statute does not apply unless the

labor and materials relate to the construction, alteration, or
repair of real property.

The telecommunications cable is personal

property, because it was installed under a license on real
property in which U S WEST Communications held no interest, it did
not benefit the real property, U S WEST Communications retained
the right to remove it, and there was no evidence of an intent to
make the cable a part of the realty.

4.

Dalton is not entitled to prejudgment interest because

the damages represented the reasonable value of the labor and
materials, which could not be determined by the use of fixed rules
of evidence and known standards of value•

ARGUMENT
Dalton totally ignores U S WEST Communications' principal
argument, that it cannot be an "owner" under the contractor's bond
statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 et seq., because the underground
telephone cable is not an improvement upon land, since it was not
installed as an integral part of the construction, alteration, or
repair of a building or structure.
11.)

(See Appellant's Brief at 5-

Rather, Dalton focuses on U S WEST Communications'

subsidiary arguments, that the cable does not add value to the
land (Appellant's Brief at 11-13), and that it is personalty, not
realty (Appellant's Brief at 13-14).

Furthermore, he clings to

the erroneous and irrelevant notion that because U S WEST
Communications had a permit from South Salt Lake City to place
cable underneath a public street, it had an "interest in land,"
thereby permitting application of the contractor's bond statute.
All of Dalton's arguments lack merit, as the following will
demonstrate.

2

I."

WHETHER U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS OWNED AN INTEREST IN THE
PUBLIC ROAD IS IRRELEVANT IN DETERMINING LIABILITY UNDER THE
CONTRACTORS BOND STATUTE.
Dalton devotes the majority of his brief to an argument that

U S WEST Communications owned a lienable interest in the public
road, and that therefore U S WEST Communications is liable under
the contractor's bond statute.

Both the premise and the

conclusion are incorrect.
U S WEST Communications agrees that interests in real
property less than fee may be subject to mechanic's liens.1
However, Dalton fails properly to distinguish between interests in
real property less than fee, such as a lease or easement, and noninterests in real property, such as a license.

In Kuhlman v.

Rivera, 701 P.2d 982 (Mont. 1985), the court distinguished between
an easement, which is a non-possessory interest in land, and a
license, stating that "a license is not an interest; a license is
merely a privilege to do some act on the land without possessing
an interest in the land."

701 P.2d at 985.

In the present case, Dalton failed to establish that U S WEST
Communications had anything more than a license to place cable
beneath the public street, in the form of a revocable excavation
permit from South Salt Lake City.

1

That the permit was written

For example, a lessee's leasehold interest is lienable,
Buehner Block Company v. Glezos. 6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d 517, 520
(1957), although an owner's interest may not be subject to a
mechanic's lien for labor and materials supplied to a sublessee,
Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1982).
See also, Allen Steel Co. v. Crossroads Plaza Associates, 119 Utah
Adv. Rep. 6, 13-14 (UtahApp., filed Oct. 6, 1989).
3

does not elevate its status above a license, since a license can
be created by either written or spoken words. Von Pollen v.
Stulgies, 177 Neb. 5, 128 N.W.2d 115, 118 (1964).

Dalton

acknowledges that there are no cases holding that a license is an
interest in land justifying application of the contractor's bond
statute.

(Respondent's Brief at 9)

Even assuming, arguendo, that U S WEST Communications' permit
constituted a lienable interest in land,2 Dalton's argument still
leads nowhere, because liability under the contractor's bond
statute does not depend at all on whether a defendant has an
interest in the land.

Rather, the critical question is whether

the defendant is an "owner," which is defined in the statute as
"any person contracting for construction, alteration9 or repair of
any building, structure, or improvement upon land."
Ann. § 14-2-1 (1987).3

Utah Code

Thus, the issue in this case is not

whether U S WEST Communications owned an interest in the public
2

The lower court specifically held that Dalton had no cause
of action under the mechanic's lien law. That ruling was not
appealed.
3

Dalton's confusion may stem from the fact that the
predecessor to the 1987 version of the contractor's bond statute
imposed liability upon "[t]he owner of any interest in land
entering into a contract . . . for the construction, addition to,
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or improvement
upon land . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1 (1986). However,
under a well recognized principle of statutory construction, the
omission of the phrase "any interest in land" in the 1987 version
implies a legislative intent to abandon that element of liability.
See 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 52.01 at 291
(4th ed. 1973) ("[If] words used in a prior statute to express a
certain meaning are omitted, it will be presumed that a change of
meaning was intended.")
4

street, but whether the laying of cable beneath the street was an
"improvement upon land" within the meaning of the statute.
Unfortunately, Dalton did not even address this issue, implying a
concession of U S WEST Communications' principal argument, that
because the cable was not installed as an integral part of a
building or structure, it was not an "improvement upon land."
II.

THE CABLE DOES NOT ADD ANY VALUE TO THE REAL PROPERTY.
Dalton correctly notes that the purpose of the contractor's

bond statute is "to protect laborers and materialmen who have
added directly to the value of the property by performing labor or
furnishing materials." Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Utah
App. 1987) (emphasis added).

The implication of that statement is

that when the labor and materials do not add to the value of the
property, the contractors bond statute does not apply.

See

Daniels v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 771 P.2d 1100
(Utah App. 1989); Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1988).
Dalton never offered any evidence that the telephone cable
added value to the property; indeed, Dalton concedes that it did
not add value.

(Respondent's Brief at 10)

Instead, Dalton argues

that because it was valuable to U S WEST Communications to have
the cable installed, the statute should apply.

In so arguing,

Dalton is attempting to revive his failed claim of unjust
enrichment, which the trial court properly rejected.

Dalton's

emphasis on preventing U S WEST Communications from receiving the
benefit of the work without paying for it ignores the undisputed
5

fact that U S WEST Communications paid for the work in the full
amount of its obligation.

Dalton is simply seeking to have U S

WEST Communications pay a second time for the same work.
III. THE UNDERGROUND CABLE IS PERSONALTY, NOT REALTY.
The contractor's bond statute does not apply unless the labor
and materials relate to the construction, alteration, or repair of
real property.

King Bros.. Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 Utah 2d

339, 374 P.2d 254, 256 (1962).

Dalton wrongly assumes that

burying an object that would otherwise be personalty converts it
ipso facto into realty.

If the telephone cable were hung from

telephone poles rather than buried under the ground, there would
be no question as to its status as personalty.

See, e.g., Cuivre

River Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. State Tax Commission. 769
S.W.2d 431 (Mo. 1989); Southwestern Public Service Co. v. Chaves
County, 85 N.M. 313, 512 P.2d 73, 79 (1973).
Utah has applied the law of fixtures to determine when
materials become part of the realty.

King Bros.. 374 P.2d at 256.

The law is well established that when a building or other
improvement is erected under a license, it "does not become a
fixture but remains the personal property of the annexer."
Jur. 2d Fixtures § 80.
(Utah 1928).

35 Am.

See Workman v. Henrie, 266 P. 1033, 1035

Furthermore,

in the absence of any other facts or circumstances tending to
show a different intention, it is generally considered that
where the landowner consents to the placing of a building on
his land by another without an express agreement as to
whether it shall become a part of the realty or remain
personalty, an agreement will be implied that such building
6

is to continue personal property, where such an agreement: is
implied, it is immaterial what is the purpose, size,
material, CI>II : mode of construction of the building.
3 5 Am.

d Fixtures § 80.

If that principle applies t~
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Other courts have reached similar conclusions regarding
buried utility facilities,

E.g., Southwestern Public Service Co.

v. Chaves County, 85 N.M. 313, 512 P.2d 73, 79 (1973); Sulphur
Springs Valley Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Citv of Tombstone, 1 Ariz App.
268, 401 P.2d 753, 758 (1965); Yellowstone Pipe Line Co. v. State
Board of Equalization, 138 Mont. 603, 358 P.2d 55, 67-69 (1960),
cert, denied, 366 U.S. 917 (1961).

See also, Manhattan Cable

Television, Inc. v. New York State Tax Commission, 137 A.D.2d 925,
524 N.Y.S.2d 889 (N.Y. 1988) (cable television cable and equipment
installed under city streets).
In the present case, the telephone cable was installed under
a public road in which U S WEST Communications held no interest.
As in Liberty, the purpose of installing the cable "was not to
benefit the abutting property but to extend and enhance" U S WEST
Communications' telephone system.

Liberty, 683 P.2d at 1121. U S

WEST Communications continues to own the cable and may repair or
remove it at its option.

Dalton introduced no evidence to show

any intention by U S WEST Communications to make the cable a part
of the realty.4
Metals Manufacturing Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74,
395 P.2d 914 (1964), cited by Dalton, is distinguishable from the
present case.

In Metals, the court held that a landlord and a

tenant could not, by agreement between themselves, declare real

4

The intention of the annexer is of prime importance in
determining when personalty becomes a fixture. See Workman v.
Henrie, 266 P. 1033, 1035 (Utah 1928).
8
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• L 0 W E R C 0 D R T ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DAMAGES WERE
LIQUIDATED, JUSTIFYING PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.
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o D a l t o n S U g g e s t s that the damages awarded are liquidated
because they represented the contract price of his work.
(Respondent's Brief at 12) This argument is misleading, because U
S WEST Communications did not have a direct contract with Dalton,
and because damages under Utah Code Ann, § 14-2-2 (1937) are not

9

In Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, 123
Utah Adv. Rep 37, 41 (Utah App*, filed December 14, 1989), this
Court denied prejudgment interest, rejecting an argument that
damages based on expert appraisals of fair market value were
liquidated because the damages were complete and the loss was
fixed as of a specific date. Quoting Fell, v. Union Pacific Ry.
Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1007 (1907), the Court stated:
For damages to be calculable with mathematical certainty,
they must be ascertained
in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known
standards of value, which the court or jury must follow
in fixing the amount, rather than be guided by their
best judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed for
past as well as for future injury, or for elements that
cannot be measured by any fixed standards of value.
In another recent case, Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781
P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court denied
prejudgment interest on lost profits damages.

The Court observed:

It is, of course, axiomatic that all claims can be reduced
eventually to monetary value. All claims would therefore at
some point become liquidated and theoretically subject to
prejudgment interest claims. Common sense precludes such an
interpretation, however.
In the present case, Dalton is attempting to do exactly what the
Utah Supreme Court said is inappropriate, that is, to claim
prejudgment interest simply because the trier of fact eventually
established the amount of damages.

There are no "fixed rules of

evidence and known standards of value," Fell, 88 P. at 1007, by
which to determine the reasonable value of labor and materials

measured by a contract price, but by reasonable value.
10
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